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Knick v. Township of Scott: Knick Knack Paddy Whack, 
Give the Takings Clause a Bone  
I. Introduction 
Picture this—you are a recent college graduate with a degree in general 
business. You are applying for any and every job opening that you can find. After 
four years of pursuing your undergraduate education and spending countless 
hours with the school’s career development office working on your resume, you 
are finally ready to enter the workforce. However, every application gets rejected 
for the same reason—you lack work experience. Each year, numerous college 
graduates face this catch-22 while seeking employment. This puzzling hurdle 
begs the question: how can one gain work experience when said experience is 
often a prerequisite for obtaining employment?  
Like the new graduate, American landowners affected by governmental 
regulations faced a similar catch-22 scenario until a recent Supreme Court 
decision. Specifically, property owners could not bring a federal action 
challenging regulatory takings of property and the compensation provided 
without first pursuing a state remedy. After seeking the state remedy, however, 
the claimant could not challenge the state’s decision, because federal courts 
would defer to the state on the matter. Essentially, these plaintiffs asserting Fifth 
Amendment claims could only litigate the claims in state court without ever 
having the opportunity for a federal court to review that decision. Thankfully, the 
Supreme Court recently rejected these arbitrary procedural requirements in Knick 
v. Township of Scott. The Knick Court redefined our understanding of the 
Takings Clause, which will both eliminate procedural unfairness to property 
owners and create new questions concerning the ripeness of Takings claims. 
Under the Takings Clause of the Constitution, the government may take 
private property for public use, but only if it provides “just compensation” to the 
property owner.
1
 Initially, courts limited governmental takings of property to 
those circumstances where the government made a “physical invasion or formal 
appropriation of the property.”
2
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United 
States expanded governmental takings of property in the early twentieth century 
to include regulatory takings, in circumstances where “regulation [of private 
                                                                                                             
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-122, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 11 (2015). 
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property] goes too far.”
3
 Property owners affected by a governmental taking often 
have the option of filing an inverse condemnation action in state court where the 




Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of Scott, property 
owners could not maintain a federal action contesting the governmental taking 
without first pursuing a remedy in state court.
5
 Additionally, federal courts were 
required to give “full faith and credit” to the state’s decision, thus precluding 
property owners from ever bringing their takings claims in federal court.
6
 As 
such, landowners often found themselves in a catch-22: they lacked standing in 
federal court until they received a final state court decision, but a federal court 
could never review the state decision. 
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Knick and its 
unfavorable treatment of previously valid Takings Clause interpretations and 
applications.
7
 Part I of this Note briefly introduces governmental takings and the 
processes by which property owners may seek just compensation. Part II explores 
the primary decisions that have developed current Takings Clause jurisprudence, 
especially those discussed and overruled by the Supreme Court in the Knick v. 
Township of Scott opinion. Part III details the specific circumstances and events 
that gave rise to the Knick litigation, and Part IV describes and explains the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the case. Part V analyzes the Supreme Court’s unique 
interpretation of the Takings Clause and surrounding jurisprudence and the 
effects this decision will have on property owners across the nation. Finally, Part 
VI discusses conclusions regarding the new interpretation and application of the 
Takings Clause and the current climate of state inverse condemnation and federal 
takings claims.  
                                                                                                             
 3. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as 
a taking.”).  
 4. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (citation omitted).  
 5. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 
(1985) (“[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property 
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and 
been denied just compensation.”), overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).  
 6. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005) (“Whatever the 
merits of that concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to 
preserve the availability of a federal forum.”).  
 7. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).  
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II. Law Before the Case 
A. The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Just Compensation for State and 
Federal Takings of Private Property 
Although just compensation is a constitutional guarantee for governmental 
takings of private property, access to federal courts concerning the matter has not 
always been a guarantee for claimants. In fact, federal courts did not have 
jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims against the United States until Congress 
adopted the Tucker Act in 1887.
8
 The Tucker Act waived sovereign immunity 
and gave jurisdiction to the United States Court of Federal Claims for any claim 
“against the United States founded . . . upon the Constitution, or any Act of 
Congress.”
9
 Specifically, the Tucker Act provided the basis for federal litigation 
of takings claims arising out of the Fifth Amendment guarantee for just 
compensation. The Supreme Court later described a takings claim as “‘founded 
upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the [Federal] Court of 
Claims to hear and determine.”
10
  
Governmental takings have significantly evolved over time; initially, most 
takings occurred in the context of physical appropriations of private land.
11
 
Before 1922, the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence centered around 
physical invasions of property typically associated with “the impacts of 
government water projects” like flooding and reduced access.
12
 However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon expanded Fifth 
Amendment claims to include governmental takings that occur when a regulation 
“goes too far.”
13
 The Court later clarified the standard for when a governmental 
regulation acts to take property: instances where the former owner experiences a 
loss of title, occupancy, or when the governmental action’s “effects are so 
complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject 
matter.”
14
 In the last half-century, Fifth Amendment claims decided by the 
Supreme Court have centered around regulatory takings.
15
 Instead of delving 
                                                                                                             
 8. See generally John W. Davis, John Randolph Tucker: The Man and His Work, 6 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 139, 141 (1949).  
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).  
 10. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (citation omitted).  
 11. MELTZ, supra note 2, at 1. 
 12. See id. at 16. 
 13. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  
 14. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).  
 15. See MELTZ, supra note 2, at 1 (“The regulatory taking concept . . . underlies many of the 
Supreme Court’s takings decisions from the 1970s on.”). 
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further into the substantive issues of the Takings Clause, the recent developments 
to the amendment’s procedural requirements
16
 will be the focus of the remainder 
of this Note.  
B. The State-Litigation Requirement and Preclusion Trap Endured by 
Property Owners Asserting Claims of Unjust Compensation for 
Governmental Takings 
Just as it is reasonable for employers to seek employees with work experience, 
the decisions giving rise to the takings procedure paradox seemed logical at the 
time. What began with a Tennessee County Planning Commission’s rejection of a 
developer’s golf course and residential plat quickly developed into one of the 
most counterintuitive procedural requirements of constitutional law.  
1. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 
and the Requirement to Seek Remedy Through State Procedures First 
In 1985, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,
17
 which initiated the chain of decisions 
that created the catch-22 procedure of Takings Clause claims. After the County 
Planning Commission rejected the development plans, the new property owner 
(who acquired the property through foreclosure) sought compensation in the 
United States District for the Middle District of Tennessee.
18
 The claim asserted 
that the commission’s “application of various zoning laws and regulations to [the 
developer’s] property amounted to a ‘taking’ of that property.”
19
 The jury 
eventually awarded the developer “$350,000 as just compensation for the 
‘taking,’” which amounted to a denial of the “‘economically viable’ use of [the] 
property.”
20
 While the district court rejected the award through a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the 
jury’s verdict on appeal.
21
 Granting certiorari on the issue of the regulatory 
taking, the Supreme Court chose to reverse and remand the Sixth Circuit on 
procedural rather than substantive grounds.
22
 
Instead of addressing the petitioners’ claim regarding governmental payment 
of money damages to private landowners for temporary takings, the Court 
rejected the jury verdict because the respondent had not “utilized the procedures 
                                                                                                             
 16. See id. at 3–11. 
 17. 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
 18. Id. at 181–82.  
 19. Id. at 175.  
 20. Id. at 175, 182. 
 21. Id. at 175. 
 22. See id. at 175–76, 200. 
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Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation.”
23
 As such, the Court 
concluded, the respondent’s claim was “not ripe” and would not become ripe 
“until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations ha[d] 




Before Williamson County, the Supreme Court had previously rejected 
compensation in takings claims for the lack of ripeness in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon
25
 and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n.
26
 The 
Agins decision substantially relied on the fact that the property owners had not 
submitted a plan for development to determine whether the local zoning 
ordinance applied to the property.
27
 Drawing parallels on these facts, the 
Williamson County decision is based on the principle that Takings Clause claims 
will not be ripe for federal court until the administrative agency decided “how it 
will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land.”
28
 Given this reasonable 
justification, it is unfortunate that the Court did not stop there.  
In addition to a final determination applying the regulation to the property, the 
Court detailed that these owners must also exhaust the available state remedy 
procedures (such as inverse condemnation proceedings) before a Takings Clause 
claim is ripe for federal court.
29
 Furthermore, the Court boldly asserted that “no 
constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.”
30
 Thus, 
in one decision, the Supreme Court relegated the Fifth Amendment’s just 
compensation protections below those of other federally protected rights.
31
 
Federal courts could not consider these Fifth Amendment claims until a state 
court weighed in on the dispute.
32
 Regardless of the Williamson County opinion’s 
opinion’s foundational issues, the actual consequences of the decision are best 
understood through the frustrations it has imposed on property owners.  
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 186. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
 26. See 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981). 
 27. 447 U.S. at 260. 
 28. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 191. 
 29. Id. at 194. 
 30. Id. at 192 n.13.  
 31. See Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: 
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody 
Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 687 (2004) (discussing the exclusion of property owners from the 
federal court system when asserting Fifth Amendment claims against governmental agencies).  
 32. Id. 
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2. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco and the 
Preclusion Trap 
It is clear just how unworkable the Williamson County state-litigation 
requirement became in practice when viewed in the context of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco.
33
 
While the Williamson County Court was content in “hand[ing] authority over 
federal takings claims to state courts” solely on the basis of local familiarity with 
land-use procedures, it wholly failed to distinguish why similar “challenges to 
municipal land-use regulations based on the First Amendment . . . or Equal 
Protection Clause” could advance directly to federal court.
34
 Nevertheless, it was 
the San Remo decision that actually shut the federal courthouse doors in the faces 
of property owners.  
In San Remo, a group of hotel owners brought Fifth Amendment takings 
claims in both state and federal court.
35
 The state court decided against the 
property owners, who then requested that the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California “exempt from § 1738’s reach claims brought 
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
36
 In essence, the property 
owners asserted that the Williamson County state-litigation requirement, in 
tandem with the full faith and credit statute, would have a preclusive effect and 
wholly prevent federal court access to these Fifth Amendment claims.
37
 If only 
the Supreme Court had as much foresight as the petitioners in San Remo, then 
perhaps the Court would have saved itself—and many others—litigation 
expenses and headaches. Instead, the Court refused to resolve the consequences 




The Williamson County Court held that Fifth Amendment claims would not 
ripen until property owners were denied compensation at the state level.
39
 Thus, it 
is reasonable to assert that the Court expected property owners to eventually have 
standing in federal court. With this Williamson County expectation in mind, it is 
difficult to reconcile the San Remo decision, which effectively held that Fifth 
                                                                                                             
 33. 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 34. Id. at 350–51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
 35. Id. at 326 (majority opinion).  
 36. Id. at 327.  
 37. See id.  
 38. See id. at 347 (“Whatever the merits of [the property owners’] concern may be, we are not 
free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal 
forum.”).  
 39. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985), 
overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
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Amendment claims were not just unripe, but more accurately improper for federal 
federal court.
40
 The full faith and credit statute “provides that ‘judicial 
proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in 
the courts of such State.’”
41
 By solely reviewing the historical background and 
foundation for the statute, the Court refused to consider the very dilemma it 
created in Williamson County and left Fifth Amendment claims to die in state 
court, caught in the clutches of the preclusion trap.
42
 
As a preview of what would come, Chief Justice Rehnquist, by way of his 
concurrence, articulated that the “justifications for [the] state-litigation 
requirement are suspect.”
43
 Furthermore, he believed “the Court should 
reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings claim based on 
on the final decision of a state or local government entity must first seek 
compensation in state courts.”
44
 It would ultimately be another thirty-four years 
until the Court accurately addressed and resolved the state-litigation requirement 
and preclusion trap preventing federal courts from having jurisdiction to hear 
Fifth Amendment claims.  
C. Consequences of the Combined Doctrines: Lack of Federal Court Access 
to Plaintiffs and Gamesmanship by Defendants 
In the years after San Remo, property owners continued to pursue just 
compensation for governmental takings of private property in state courts. 
Ironically, the government defendants—like those in San Remo and Williamson 





—began to remove takings cases to federal courts.
46
 The government 
defendants in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, for 
                                                                                                             
 40. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347 (“‘[A] claim that the application of government regulations 
effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the 
regulations to the property at issue,’ consequently, there is scant precedent for the litigation in 
federal district court of claims that a state agency has taken property in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.” (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186)). 
 41. Id. at 336 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738).  
 42. See id. at 338 (“Federal courts . . . are not free to disregard [the full faith and credit statute] 
simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court.”).  
 43. Id. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 326 (majority opinion); see also Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 185 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019). 
 46. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 161 (1997).  
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example, removed a just compensation claim (alleging both federal and state 
constitutional violations) to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction.
47
 
The Supreme Court granted review to consider the jurisdictional issue.
48
 
Specifically, the Court contemplated whether a defendant could remove a case 
when it contains both: (1) claims for federal law violations by state agencies and 
(2) “state law claims for on-the-record review of the administrative findings.”
49
 
Placing the question in the context of supplemental and federal question 
jurisdiction, the Court determined that the federal district court could indeed 
exercise jurisdiction over the claims.
50
  
While the answers to the jurisdictional questions in City of Chicago are not 
called into question here, the resulting consequences are indicative of yet another 
layer of disparity and hardships imposed on takings claimants. Because of 
Williamson County, plaintiffs could not initiate a lawsuit asserting Fifth 
Amendment takings claims in federal court. However, after City of Chicago, 
defendants could remove these same claims to federal court and get them 
dismissed for lack of ripeness or exhaustion of state remedies.
51
  
In Warner v. City of Marathon, plaintiffs initiated, inter alia, a takings action 
in Florida state court.
52
 Immediately, the defendants removed the case to federal 
court and argued that the state law claim arose under a federal question—the 
Fifth Amendment.
53
 Thereafter, the government defendants sought to dismiss the 
takings claim on the ground that it was unripe, according to Williamson County’s 
exhaustion of state remedies requirement.
54
 The district court agreed with the 
defendants and granted the dismissal; the plaintiff appealed the decision to the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
55
 Correctly applying Williamson County, the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision because a Florida court had 
not denied the plaintiff just compensation.
56
 So, even though the plaintiff initially 
filed the inverse condemnation claim in state court as required by Williamson 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 163. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 174. The Court further elaborated that ICS’s complaint alleged violations of the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause, which a federal court would have original jurisdiction over. Moreover, 
the state-law claims regarding the administrative procedures could be properly considered by the 
federal court through supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 164–65. 
 51. See Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017) (determining 
that plaintiffs’ claims were not yet ripe for review).  
 52. Id. at 836. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 837. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 838. 
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County, the defendants could remove the action and immediately dismiss the suit 
for lack of a state court denial. Warner encapsulates the gamesmanship and 
paradoxical effects Williamson County left on takings claimants.  
Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s takings 
claims, other courts have begun to recognize the bad-faith nature of such actions 
by defendants.
57
 For example, the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s 
denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss following the removal of a takings 
action to the district court.
58
 Playing the same game as the Warner defendants, 
the Township of Pennfield sought dismissal for lack of ripeness.
59
 Even so, the 
district court denied the motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs 
because the defendants “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal” 
the federal court clearly lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim.
60
 Even though the 
Sixth Circuit’s ruling provided takings claimants some relief in that circuit, it did 
not resolve the many challenges faced by property owners in the other circuit 
courts. Furthermore, the procedural hurdles remained, preventing takings 
plaintiffs from filing their Fifth Amendment claims in federal courts.  
III. Statement of the Case  
A. Facts 
The case that redefined the Fifth Amendment’s protections—Knick v. 
Township of Scott—all started with an eighty-five-year-old man’s genealogy 
research.
61
 Robert Vail, Sr., a resident of the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania 
(“the township”), “believed [his] ancestors were buried” on his neighbor’s 
property after conducting a genealogy study.
62
 Unfortunately for Vail, his 
neighbor, Rose Mary Knick, did not welcome the idea of people roaming around 
her ninety-acre rural property.
63
 Accordingly, Knick, who had lived on the 
                                                                                                             
 57. See, e.g., A Forever Recovery, Inc. v. Twp. of Pennfield, 606 F. App’x 279, 283–84 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (concluding that the district court did not err in determining that defendant removed the 
case in bad faith); Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (concluding that defendants’ efforts to seek remand back to state court after removing the 
action to federal court “smacks of bad faith”). 
 58. Forever Recovery, 606 F. App’x at 283–84. 
 59. Id. at 282. 
 60. Id. at 281. 
 61. See Jessica Gresko, Cemetery Case Puts Property Rights Issue Before High Court, AP 
NEWS (Oct. 4, 2018), http://apnews.com/86ec9d89d4d34579b528845f5f8c1642. 
 62. Jason Nark, N.E. Pennsylvania Woman Wins U.S. Supreme Court Case to Keep Grave 
Seekers off Her Land, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 21, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/ 
court-scotus-pennsylvania-property-constitution-20190621.html; Gresko, supra note 61. 
 63. See Gresko, supra note 61. 
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property since 1970, hired an attorney to help her look for records or physical 
landmarks on the property that would indicate the presence of an ancient burial 
site.
64
 When they could not find any indications of such a graveyard, Knick even 
“invited township officials to [find] the supposed burial site.”
65
 Even so, the 
officials declined the offer at the time.
66
 Vail, who wanted to visit the cemetery 




In 2012, the township adopted an ordinance requiring that “[a]ll cemeteries . . . 
shall be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours.”
68
 A 
violation of the ordinance subjected the property owner to a fine between $300 
and $600, and “[e]ach day that the violation exist[ed] . . . constitut[ed] a separate 
offense.”
69
 Furthermore, the ordinance’s definition of a “cemetery” clearly 
encompassed the alleged graveyard on Knick’s private land.
70
 Pursuant to the 
township’s ordinance, a code enforcement officer visited the property and “found 
several grave markers on Knick’s property.”
71
 The officer then notified Knick that 
that she was violating the ordinance for failure to keep the property open to the 
public during the day.
72
 
B. Procedural History and Issue 
Upon receipt of the citation, Knick challenged the alleged regulatory taking of 
her property in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
73
 Instead of 
pursuing an inverse condemnation action, however, Knick asked the Lackawanna 
County Court of Common Pleas to declare the ordinance unconstitutional in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
74
 The township then agreed 
                                                                                                             
 64. Rose Mary Knick, Your View by Pa. Woman Who Won Supreme Court Case: It’s My 
Farm but It’s Everybody’s Constitution, MORNING CALL (July 14, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-opi-knick-versus-scott-township-20190714-vqvtfex25 
rev5adtvf2xtplu3u-story.html. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Gresko, supra note 61. 
 68. Scott Township, Lackawanna County, Pa., Ordinance No. 12-12-20-001 § 5 (2012).  
 69. Id. § 7.  
 70. See id. § 1(c) (defining “cemetery” as “[a] place or area of ground, whether contained on 
private or public property, which has been set apart for or otherwise utilized as a burial ground for 
deceased human beings”).  
 71. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019).  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, No. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016 WL 4701549, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 
Sept. 8, 2016) (providing the procedural history of Knick’s state court action).  
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to stay enforcement of the ordinance during the pendency of the lawsuit.
75
 
Ironically, the lack of an ongoing enforcement action forced the state court to 
dismiss Knick’s request for relief, because she could no longer “demonstrate the 
irreparable harm necessary” to enjoin the ordinance.
76
  
Upon dismissal of the state court action, Knick initiated another proceeding in 
federal district court, maintaining her belief that the ordinance violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.
77
 Applying the Williamson County exhaustion 
requirement, the district court dismissed Knick’s lawsuit because she had not 
exhausted her remedies at state law through an inverse condemnation action.
78
 
Then, Knick appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 




A. The Majority Opinion 
To preface the discussion of the competing views advanced by the parties, the 
underlying discourse in Knick centers on when a Takings Clause violation has 
occurred. Initially, the Supreme Court began its analysis by looking at the central 
cases that shaped the current understanding and application of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.
80
 First, the Court discussed Williamson County’s 
ripeness requirements of exhaustion both at the administrative level (applying the 
regulation to the property) and through the state’s just compensation (inverse 
condemnation) cause of action.
81
 Because Knick did not challenge the first 
exhaustion requirement, the Court then quickly dove into discussing the purpose, 
context, and merits of the state just compensation requirement.
82
 
First, the Court considered the significant and “unanticipated consequences” 
that Williamson County would eventually have on property owners affected by 
                                                                                                             
 75. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Knick, 2016 WL 4701549, at *5–6. 
 79. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2017).  
 80. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169–72. 
 81. Id. at 2169. 
 82. See id. (“According to the Court, ‘if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking 
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the [Takings] Clause until it has 
used the procedure and been denied just compensation.’” (quoting Williamson Cnty. Reg’l 
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 
2179)). 
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 Enter San Remo and the preclusion trap. Digging into the 
San Remo opinion, the Court recited the facts: a group of takings plaintiffs 
“complied with Williamson County and brought a claim for compensation in 
state court.”
84
 Yet, the plaintiffs only sought relief under the state constitution 
takings clause, while hoping to retain “their Fifth Amendment claim for a later 
federal suit if the state suit proved unsuccessful.”
85
 Unfortunately for the San 
Remo plaintiffs, the lower courts held—and the Supreme Court affirmed—“the 
full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, required the federal court to give 
preclusive effect to the state court’s decision.”
86
 While Williamson County 
required a state proceeding and determination to give “rise to a ripe federal 
takings claim,” San Remo “simultaneously barred that claim” and wholly 
“prevent[ed] the federal court from ever considering it.”
87
 Hence, the aptly coined 
phrase, preclusion trap, refers to the no-win situation that these decisions 
imposed on takings claimants.  
Importantly, the Knick Court understood the detriments that these two 
decisions imposed on property owners. Specifically, the Knick majority 
articulated that the state just compensation requirement “relegates the Takings 
Clause ‘to the status of a poor relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.”
88
 While other constitutional claims are guaranteed federal court access, 
“the state-litigation requirement ‘hand[s] authority over federal takings claims to 
state courts.’”
89
 Before the Court further reasoned its disfavor of Williamson 
County, it stated the more appropriate interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Takings Clause, per the Court, confers a property owner with a claim of violation 
“as soon as a government takes his property for public use without paying for 
it.”
90
 This understanding of the clause enables property owners to bring takings 
claims in federal court without enduring a state inverse condemnation action.
91
 
With this clear predictor of the Court’s outcome, the majority opinion retraced 
its steps to illustrate how it developed this refined Takings Clause interpretation 
                                                                                                             
 83. See id. (“The unanticipated consequences of this ruling were not clear until 20 years later, 
when this Court decided San Remo.”).  
 84. Id. (citing San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 331 (2005)).  
 85. Id. (citing San Remo, 545 U.S. at 331–32).  
 86. Id. (citing San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)).  
 89. Id. at 2170 (quoting San Remo, 545 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).  
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. (“If a local government takes private property without paying for it, that 
government has violated the Fifth Amendment—just as the Takings Clause says—without regard to 
subsequent state court proceedings.”). 
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 Knick takes us back to Williamson County, its predecessors, 
and its progeny. The Williamson County Court believed a governmental taking 
gave property owners “a right to a state law procedure that [would] eventually 
result in just compensation.”
93
  
Part of the Williamson County Court’s understanding of the Takings Clause 
derived from Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., where a plaintiff sought injunctive 
relief against a federal statute that effected a taking.
94
 In Ruckelshaus, though, 
“the statute set up a special arbitration procedure for obtaining compensation,” 
and the plaintiff retained the right to assert a Tucker Act claim if arbitration 
proved unsuccessful.
95
 In rejecting the claim, the Knick Court noted that 
“[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin” a governmental taking of property 
“when a suit for compensation” is available after the taking occurred.
96
 When 
monetary relief is still available, equitable relief will not be available, which, 
according to Knick, is “consistent with [the Court’s] precedent.”
97
  
Even still, the Ruckelshaus Court further elaborated that if the plaintiff 
obtained any compensation through arbitration, then “no taking has occurred and 
the [plaintiff] has no claim against the Government.”
98
 Once endorsed by 
Williamson County, this view greatly exceeded reasonable constitutional 
interpretation and construction. Notably, the Williamson County Court believed 
that “[i]f the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining 
compensation, and if resort to that process ‘yield[s] just compensation,’ then the 
property owner ‘has no claim against the Government’ for a taking.”
99
 
According to Knick, this view is fundamentally wrong in two respects. First, 
Williamson County correctly stated that a justly compensated plaintiff no longer 
has a claim, but this claim evaporates “not because there was no taking in the 
first place.”
100
 Instead, the plaintiff no longer retains a claim “because the taking 
has been remedied by compensation.”
101
 Second, the Williamson County Court 
incorrectly believed that “taking[s] claims against the Federal Government are 
                                                                                                             
 92. See id. at 2170–78. 
 93. Id. at 2171 (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172, 195 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179). 
 94. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998–99 (1984).  
 95. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1018).  
 96. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016. 
 97. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173. 
 98. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21.  
 99. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985), 
overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1013, 1018 n.21).  
 100. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173. 
 101. Id.  
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premature until the property owner” has endured the Tucker Act’s processes.
102
 
The Knick majority distinctly disagreed, advancing the notion that a just 
compensation claim “brought under the Tucker Act is not a prerequisite to a Fifth 
Amendment takings claim—it is a Fifth Amendment takings claim.”
103
 The Knick 
Knick Court supported this contention by noting that “[a] party who loses a 
Tucker Act suit has nowhere else to go to seek compensation for an alleged 
taking.”
104
 Accordingly, the Tucker Act, by itself, is not a claim that a plaintiff 
must pursue before a takings claim may be advanced. Instead, it is merely the 
vehicle utilized to assert a takings claim in federal court. 
According to the Knick majority, the Williamson County Court also 
mischaracterized much of the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause precedent—most 
notably Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.
105
 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion directly addressed Cherokee Nation and its progeny. 
It highlighted that each takings claim dealt with requests for injunctive relief, 
which is distinguishable from demands for compensation.
106
 Specifically, the 
Chief Justice expressed: just “because the property owner was not entitled to 
injunctive relief at the time of the taking does not mean there was no violation of 
the Takings Clause at that time.”
107
  
After an extensive historical analysis, the Chief Justice emphasized that 
Takings Clause jurisprudence has traditionally held that injunctive relief will be 
denied so long as “property owners ha[ve] an adequate remedy at law.”
108
 This 
tradition suggests that the availability of the just compensation procedure does 
not itself prevent a constitutional violation from happening.
109
 Instead, the 
process for obtaining just compensation is actually the remedy for such a 
constitutional violation.
110
 Ultimately, the Knick Court’s renewed view and 
redefined interpretation of the Takings Clause directly contrasts the Williamson 
County decision. As such, the Court then turned to address “whether stare 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. at 2174 (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 195). 
 103. Id. at 2174. 
 104. Id.  
 105. See id. at 2175 (“The Court in Williamson County relied on statements in our prior 
opinions that the Clause ‘does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in 
advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken.’” (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 
135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)).  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2176 (citing Stetson v. Chicago & Evanston R.R. Co., 75 Ill. 74, 78 (1874)). 
 109. See id. at 2177.  
 110. See id. at 2176–77. 
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Considering whether to overrule Williamson County, the Court first 
emphasized how maintaining a settled rule of law is generally more important 
than having the rule of law settled correctly.
112
 Because stare decisis is at its 
weakest when referring to constitutional interpretation, the Court began by 
weighing the competing interests and impact of overturning precedent.
113
 After a 
thorough analysis criticizing the quality of the Williamson County reasoning and 
the workability of the state-litigation rule, the Knick Court held that the 1985 
decision did not deserve application of the doctrine of stare decisis.
114
 
Accordingly, a landowner may challenge an uncompensated governmental taking 
of property in federal court.
115
 Vacating the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court allowed Rose Mary Knick to continue pursuing compensation for 
the regulatory taking of the alleged graveyard on her property.
116
 Additionally, 
after thirty years of frustrating property owners affected by governmental takings, 
Knick finally abandoned the impracticality of Williamson County.  
B. Justice Kagan’s Dissent 
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice Kagan wrote 
fearfully of the majority’s refusal to adhere to stare decisis.
117
 Indeed, the 
dissenting justices voiced these concerns quite clearly, noting the majority’s 
holding “conflict[s] with precedent after precedent.”
118
 Notably, the dissent 
criticizes the Knick holding on three grounds: (1) it will cause innocent 
governmental actors to frequently commit constitutional violations, (2) the 
courts will overflow with claims that turn on the intricacies of state law, and (3) 
the decision encourages the rejection of stare decisis.
119
 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. at 2177.  
 112. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).  
 113. Id.; see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235 (“[Stare decisis] is at its weakest when we interpret 
the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by 
overruling our prior decisions.”).  
 114. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178–79.  
 115. Id. at 2179. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 2181, 2187 (lamenting that the majority’s decision “transgresses all usual 
principles of stare decisis,” will “turn even well-meaning government officials into lawbreakers,” 
and “subvert[s] important principles of judicial federalism”). 
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The dissent criticized the majority’s rejection of both Williamson County and 
the Court’s historical understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s protections.
120
 In 
addition to its concerns for precedent, the dissent starkly disagreed with the 
Court’s renewed view of the protections that the Takings Clause affords.
121
 In 
fact, Justice Kagan believed the Knick decision held “that a government violates 
the Constitution whenever it takes property without advance compensation—no 
matter how good its commitment to pay.”
122
 But the Justice failed to elaborate on 
what commitment the municipal government had made to compensate property 
owners like Knick.  
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas’s concurrence aptly described the commitment: 
“the government ‘implicitly promises to pay compensation for any taking’ if a 
property owner successfully sues the government in court.”
123
 The concurring 
Justice further noted, “The Fifth Amendment does not merely provide a damages 
remedy to a property owner willing to shoulder the burden of securing 
compensation after the government takes property without paying for it.”
124
 As 
such, Justice Thomas expressly and adequately addressed the concerns articulated 
articulated by the dissenting justices.  
V. Analysis 
The Knick decision has already left incredible consequences on Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence ranging from ensuring federal court access for takings 
plaintiffs to preventing gamesmanship by government defendants. Before 
addressing the effects of the decision, Justice Kagan’s dissenting views are 
particularly noteworthy, even to those without a stake in the development of 
property rights. The dissent raised two critical warnings about the majority’s 
decision. First, and perhaps most clearly, it warned about two primary 
ramifications the Knick decision will have on the Court’s Takings Clause 
jurisprudence.
125
 Second, Justice Kagan expressed concerns for the majority’s 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 2180. But see id. at 2177 (majority opinion) (“But under today’s decision every one 
of the cases cited by the dissent would come out the same way—the plaintiffs would not be entitled 
to the relief they requested because they could instead pursue a suit for compensation.”). 
 121. See id. at 2181–83 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 122. Id. at 2181 (emphasis added).  
 123. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Supplemental Letter Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae 5). 
 124. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  
 125. See id. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s decision] will have two damaging 
consequences. It will inevitably turn even well-meaning government officials into lawbreakers. And 
it will subvert important principles of judicial federalism.”). 
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willingness to overturn the Williamson County precedent, which she believed 
foreshadowed more rejection of stare decisis in the future.
126
  
As noted above, the dissent argued that the Court’s decision would 
detrimentally affect takings disputes in two primary ways. First, Justice Kagan 
believed the decision would transform innocent governmental employees into 
constitutional violators.
127
 Moreover, she argued the new rule subjected highly 
localized state property law to federal courts.
128
 Because these contentions are 
without merit, Justice Kagan’s concerns for the rejection of stare decisis are 
exaggerated.  
At first glance, the dissent’s concern for innocent government employees 
seems to be valid, because everyday takings would become constitutional 
violations. Yet, Justice Thomas, once again, shed light on these misplaced fears. 
If the Court’s decision “makes some regulatory programs ‘unworkable in 
practice,’ so be it—[the Court’s] role is to enforce the Takings Clause as 
written.”
129
 As one commenter noted, Justice Kagan’s argument seeks to allow 
“[l]ocal governments [to] run afoul of the [T]akings [C]lause precisely because 
they so routinely deprive people of their constitutional rights.”
130
 Allowing 
government officials to continue such a practice only out of convenience rather 
than “compensating property owners . . . is irrational.”
131
 Further, the majority’s 
decision does not affect the constitutional validity of these governmental actors’ 
choices. The program in question does not violate the Constitution unless it 
concerns a taking of private property without just compensation—which is 
identical to the prior treatment of programs in state courts.
132
 
                                                                                                             
 126. Id. at 2190 (noting that Justice Breyer had wondered when the majority would overrule 
another case and offering, “[W]ell that didn’t take long. Now one may wonder yet again.”). 
 127. Id. at 2187 (“[The majority’s decision] will inevitably turn even well-meaning government 
officials into lawbreakers.”). 
 128. Id. (“[T]he majority’s ruling channels to federal courts a (potentially massive) set of cases 
that more properly belongs . . . in state courts . . . .”). 
 129. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Supplemental Letter Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae 5).  
 130. Timothy Sandefur, The Supreme Court Rights a Property-Rights Wrong, GOLDWATER 
INST. (June 21, 2019), https://indefenseofliberty.blog/2019/06/21/the-supreme-court-rights-a-
property-rights-wrong/. 
 131. Id.  
 132. See Ilya Somin, Supreme Court Overrules Precedent That Created “Catch-22” for 
Property Owners Attempting to Bring Takings Cases in Federal Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(June 21, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://reason.com/2019/06/21/supreme-court-overrules-precedent-
that-created-catch-22-for-property-owners-attempting-to-bring-takings-cases-in-federal-court/ 
(“Exactly the same thing happens when the regulatory program in question is challenged in state 
court, and the latter rules that it was a taking.”). 
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Next, the dissent voiced concerns about allowing federal judges to decide the 
intricacies of state law,
133
 but this argument is also flawed. The Court does not 
similarly deny federal court access to any other constitutional protection simply 
because state officials might be more familiar with the details of the state laws.
134
 
Further, Justice Kagan’s theory overlooks a key factor. State officials’ intimate 
knowledge of state law does not give them any additional advantage “in property 
rights cases than they have in other constitutional cases where the outcome may 
depend on interpretations of state law.”
135
 As such, Justice Kagan’s concern for 
federal judges considering state-specific property laws is unsupported by other 
areas of constitutional jurisprudence.  
Ultimately, the dissent, arguing for stare decisis, simply chose the “wrong hill 
to die on.”
136
 Whatever justifications stare decisis holds for adherence to 
precedent, Williamson County strikes against the most fundamental protections 
of the Fifth Amendment. The state litigation requirement, though undisturbed for 
thirty years, proved to be neither supported by Takings Clause jurisprudence nor 
workable in practice.
137
 Justice Kagan voiced concerns for “reversing legal 
course” when a later Court determines an earlier ruling to be incorrect.
138
 These 
concerns, however, overstate the Court’s rejection of precedent in Knick. 
Williamson County demonstrated more than an incorrect interpretation of the 
Fifth Amendment: it almost wholly barred the Amendment’s protection of 
property owners affected by regulatory takings. 
The Knick decision is best understood with these dissenting views in mind. 
First and foremost, Knick disposed of Williamson County’s state litigation 
requirement for takings claims.
139
 Implicit in Knick’s overruling of Williamson 
County is the disposal of the San Remo preclusion trap. Nevertheless, ripeness 
still requires Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims to obtain a final 
                                                                                                             
 133. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2188–89. 
 134. Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a Catch-22 That Barred Takings Cases 
From Federal Court, 2018-2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 164–65 (comparing federal court 
considerations of the Fifth Amendment with those of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment).  
 135. Id. at 165. 
 136. Robert H. Thomas, Knick Analysis, Part IV: Why Not Let Sleeping Dogs Lie? The Dissent 
and Stare Decisis, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (June 24, 2019), https://www.inverse 
condemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2019/06/knick-analysis-part-iv.html (criticizing Justice 
Kagan’s description of Fifth Amendment rights after Williamson County). 
 137. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178 (“[Williamson County’s] reasoning was exceptionally ill founded 
founded and conflicted with much of our takings jurisprudence.”). See also supra Section II.C. 
 138. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 2177 (majority opinion). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/7
2021] NOTES 813 
 
 
administrative decision before a federal court may have standing.
140
 That aspect 
of Williamson County remains valid law. 
Obviously, Knick has opened the federal courthouse doors to takings claims. 
Yet, the decision does not require these claimants to litigate in federal court. 
Property owners still have the option to pursue their claims in state court, so 
Knick will inevitably lead to some forum shopping on the part of property owners 
affected by far-reaching regulations. The property owners who assert their claims 
in state court, however, will likely be unable to bring a later federal lawsuit of the 
same nature.
141
 Additionally, if the litigation began in state court, then 
government defendants would have the option to remove the Fifth Amendment 
claim to federal court. Whereas before Knick, this removal would lead to a 
subsequent dismissal for failure to finalize state litigation,
142
 government 
defendants will no longer be able to play the removal-and-dismiss game.  
Going forward, property owners wishing to litigate their takings claims in 
federal court should assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action seeking just 
compensation as the remedy. As noted by the Ruckelshaus discussion in the 
Knick opinion, property owners may not enjoin a regulatory taking in federal 
court unless compensation is unavailable.
143
 What remains unclear is whether a 





Unfortunately for many recent graduates, the Knick decision did not resolve 
the challenge resulting from their lack of work experience. Knick, however, ended 
                                                                                                             
 140. See id. (disposing only of the state-litigation requirement). 
 141. Despite discussing the detrimental effects San Remo and Williamson County had on 
property owners, the Court only overruled Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement. Id. at 
2179 (“But, as we held in San Remo, the state court’s resolution of the plaintiff's inverse 
condemnation claim has preclusive effect in any subsequent federal suit.”). Accordingly, San Remo 
still applies when property owners are denied relief in state courts—federal courts will have to give 
the state decision “full faith and credit.” See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 
323, 347 (2005) (“[W]e are not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve 
the availability of a federal forum.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(determining, after defendant removed the case to federal court, that plaintiffs’ claims were not yet 
ripe for review). 
 143. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173. 
 144. Id. at 2174 n.5 (“[The Solicitor General argued] that state inverse condemnation claims 
‘aris[e] under’ federal law and can be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 through the 
Grable doctrine.”). The Court did not address the Solicitor General’s argument because it 
determined that a federal takings claim may be brought immediately through § 1983. Id.  
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ended the doctrinal paradox that has frustrated landowners for over thirty years. 
Ultimately, this decision is a meaningful procedural win for property owners, but 
the substantive merits of Rose Mary Knick’s claim remain unchanged. In the end, 
end, Knick imparts only one change to Takings Clause jurisprudence: property 
owners challenging regulatory takings no longer have to rely on state courts as 
their sole tribunal. The Knick Court abolished a detrimental, contradictory 
standard that prevented federal courts from ever resolving these constitutional 
claims. While we may never know if a graveyard remains on Rose Mary Knick’s 
property, one thing is clear—Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement 
has finally been laid to rest.  
 
Gatlin Squires 
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